The value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya. Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 16 by Orr, A et al.
  
Socioeconomics  
Discussion Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
Series Paper Number 16 
 
The value chain for sorghum beer in 
Kenya 
 
A. Orr, C. Mwema, W. Mulinge1 
ICRISAT, Nairobi, A.Orr@cgiar.org  
1: KARI, Nairobi, Kenya 
4/16/2013 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Disclaimer 
This paper is part of ICRISAT Economics Discussion paper series. This series disseminates 
the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about a wide array of 
issues in the area of agriculture for development. An objective of the series is to get the 
findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry 
the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. Any comments and suggestions 
are more than welcome and should be addressed to the author who’s contact details can be 
found at the bottom of the cover page. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent 
the views of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics and its 
affiliated organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About ICRISAT 
The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (lCRISAT) is a 
non-profit, non-political organization that conducts agricultural research for development in 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa with a wide array of partners throughout the world. Covering 
6.5 million square kilometers of land in 55 countries, the semi-arid tropics have over 2 billion 
people, of whom 644 million are the poorest of the poor. ICRISAT innovations help the 
dryland poor move from poverty to prosperity by harnessing markets while managing risks – 
a strategy called Inclusive Market- Oriented development (lMOD). ICRISAT is headquartered 
in Patancheru near Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India, with two regional hubs and five 
country offices in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a member of the CGIAR Consortium. 
www.icrisat.org  
CGIAR is a global agriculture research partnership for a food secure future. Its science is 
carried out by 15 research Centers who are members of the CGIAR Consortium in 
collaboration with hundreds of partner organizations. www.cgiar.org 
This work has  
been undertaken 
as part of the 
The value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya 
 
                                                                            ICRISAT - Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 2 
Acknowledgements: We would like to acknowledge all the persons and organizations who 
contributed to this research. For information, special thanks go to Sylvester Ndeda, David 
Kinuthia, Bernard Oyoo and David Kinuthia of East African Breweries Ltd (EABL), Paul 
Muthangya (EUCORD), Silas Mwiti Ragwa (KARI Seed Unit), Taylor Mburu (Africa Harvest), 
Consolata (Jukoma Enterprises), and Wambui (Sky pub bar).  
The Smart Logistics team, Rose Mutuku and Wilson Muchiri Theuri shared information on 
their business model, and Smart Logistics field officers, Loise Mwangangi, Pauline Kanani, 
Saili Mulevu and Jeff Mweti assisted with the reconnaissance visits and the grower survey. 
Rhoda Mulevu (Chairperson, Maliku cluster), Linah Nzambi (Chairperson, Kawongo cluster), 
and William Komo (Chairperson, Kanduti Farmers field school cluster) assisted with 
sampling of group members. We thank Bernard Munyua for assistance in supervision of the 
grower survey and our 12 enumerators, Chris Musyoki, Mercy Ndakithi, Anna Mwelu, 
Charles Mulevu, Celestine Mutheu, Dorothy Mutheo, Damaris Mwikali, Kingoo Munyao, 
Samson Kioko, Ruth Mutua, Nicholas Kiteme and Mutinda Anthony.  Finally, thanks to the 
officials of the Smart Logistics farmer groups and their members who took time to participate 
in the survey. 
Joachim Weber gave advice on ValueLinks methods for value chain mapping and value 
addition. 
Abstract 
This discussion paper analyses the value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya, from growing 
Gadam sorghum to the production and retailing of Senator Keg. The business model 
developed by Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd. was used to analyze social inclusion in the 
value chain. A stratified random sample of 300 members and non-members of Smart 
Logistics groups in eastern Kenya was sampled in the main growing season for sorghum in 
2012-2013. Based on interviews with major actors, the Value Links methodology was used 
to map the value chain and quantify value addition at different stages of the value chain. 
Analysis of value addition showed that growers received 4 % of the retail price of sorghum 
beer, Smart Logistics 1 %, EABL 81 %, Senator keg distributors 5 % and Senator keg 
retailers 9 %. No information was available on intermediate costs or value added for 
sorghum brewing. Profitability for Smart Logistics depended on volume while, following the 
imposition of excise duty in 2013, profitability for retailers was negative. The average 
member of a Smart Logistics group planted 1.71 acres to sorghum and harvested 483 kg per 
household of which 305 kg (63 %) was sold. Shortage of land, shortage of labour, and low 
profitability were reported as the most important constraints on sorghum production. Bird-
scaring and threshing were the two most important labour constraints. Ninety percent of 
group members sold their sorghum to Smart Logistics. The main complaint by members was 
the time spent waiting for payment. The average time waiting for payment was 4.5 weeks.  
Only 5 % of growers were paid within the 1-week target set by Smart Logistics. On average, 
members selling to a Smart Logistics collection centre in 2012 sold 342 kg of sorghum at a 
price of 25 KES/kg, earning KES 8,550 from sorghum sales. Most income from sorghum was 
invested in children’s education. Members of Smart Logistics groups spent an average of 
KES 32,000 on education per year, of which KES 18,000 went on university education. 
Income from sorghum (KES 8,550) was equivalent to one quarter of annual investment in 
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education. A significantly higher share (83%) of the members of Smart Logistics groups 
reported an improvement in their economic position since 2009 compared to non-members 
(70%).Members of Smart Logistics groups were significantly more likely to be headed by 
women, have high dependency ratios, and own less land per adult family member. 
Membership was not significantly related to income per head. The main reason given by 
non-members for not joining a Smart Logistics group was that they did not have time to 
attend group meetings and meetings at demonstration plots. The price of sorghum beer 
depends on the level of excise duty. From 2004 Senator Keg enjoyed zero excise duty, 
making it competitive with illegal brews. As a result, Senator Keg became EABL’s best-
selling beer by volume. However, a sharp rise in public expenditure and domestic debt has 
increased the need for government to raise tax revenues. Following imposition of a 50 % 
excise duty in 2013, sales of Senator keg have fallen by an estimated 80 %. In the long-
term, the future of sorghum beer in Kenya depends on growth in income per head. In the 
short term, it depends on lower excise duty to make it more affordable for low-income 
consumers. 
 
Keywords: Value chain, sorghum beer, value addition, social inclusion 
JEL classification: Q110, Q130, L660 
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1 Introduction 
Sorghum (Sorghum bicolor (L.) Moench) is widely grown as a food crop in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but commercialization has proved difficult for several reasons. Sorghum is grown in 
marginal, semi-arid environments characterized by low and erratic rainfall. In drought years, 
growers prioritize household food security and are reluctant to sell, making it difficult for 
buyers to ensure a consistent supply. Semi-arid environments are also characterized by low 
population density, poor infrastructure, and limited access to markets, which raises 
transaction costs and reduces incentives for both growers and buyers.  
Recently, competition for Africa’s growing beer market has stimulated commercialization of 
sorghum to produce clear sorghum beer. The development of the value chain for sorghum 
beer has involved partnerships between national governments, multinational companies, 
plant breeders, intermediary suppliers, and sorghum growers (van Wijk and Kwakkenbos, 
2011). Competition between multinational breweries has spurred the rapid spread of this 
value chain and sorghum beer is currently produced in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Zambia. Multinational breweries view the value chain for sorghum beer as a 
model for ‘inclusive business’ that can be replicated across Africa (Diageo plc, 2011). 
Increased demand for local sorghum is expected to benefit smallholders and contribute to 
poverty reduction. However, there has been no systematic evaluation of the benefits to 
smallholders from the value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya or whether it is justified to 
describe this value chain as ‘pro poor’. 
This study explores the value chain for sorghum beer from production to consumption. The 
main objective of the study was to assess the benefits of the value chain for smallholders. 
The specific objectives were to: 
1. Map the value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya; 
2. Measure value addition by input suppliers, growers, intermediaries, and brewers; 
3. Identify the challenges faced by the value chain actors; 
4. Identify the factors influencing growers’ participation in the value chain; and 
5. Assess the inclusiveness of the Smart Logistics business model. 
The report is organised as follows. The next section discusses methodology. Section 3 
provides the context for the development of sorghum beer in Kenya. The value chain is 
analysed in Section 4, while section 5 presents the results of the grower survey. Section 6 
analyses inclusion in the Smart Logistics business model, while the final section summarises 
our conclusions. 
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2 Data and methods  
2.1 Value chain mapping 
Information on value addition was obtained from interviews held with key informants from 
Smart Logistics, EABL, EUCORD, Africa Harvest, KARI Katumani Commercial Seed Unit, 
Senator keg distributors and retailers. The value chain was mapped using the ValueLinks 
approach (GTZ, 2007). 
2.2 Value addition 
Value added is defined as the additional value of a commodity over the cost of the 
commodity used to produce it in the previous stage of production. Costs and revenues for 
the different actors were collected. Value added for each value chain actor was estimated 
using the ValueLinks definition, subtracting the costs of intermediate inputs from the total 
value generated (Figure 1).  For primary producers, the customary practice is to ignore 
intermediate inputs and equate value added with the sales price. Family labour is valued at 
zero on the assumption that no more profitable opportunity is available. For other actors in 
the value chain, intermediate costs include the cost of 1 kg of sorghum grain, the cost of 
other inputs, and the cost of operational services. These include services that are 
outsourced or services (water, electricity, transport, licences) bought from other service 
providers. Since EABL did not provide information on costs, we were unable to estimate 
value addition for brewing. To compare the value added at different stages in the value 
chain, we standardized value addition per kg of sorghum grain. 
Figure 1. Value addition calculations 
 
Source: GIZ ( 2007) ValueLinks Module 2. 
2.3 Growers survey 
A multistage stratified sampling technique was used to randomly select 300 sorghum 
growers (150 members of Smart Logistics groups and 150 non-members). First, we 
purposely selected three clusters located in Lower Yatta, Katulani, and Nzambani districts 
where Smart Logistics groups had started operations in 2009. Second, five Smart Logistics 
groups were randomly sampled from each cluster, giving a total of 15 groups. Third, we 
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randomly sampled 10 members from each group (Table 1). As a control group, we randomly 
selected 150 non-members, living in the same villages as members, from a list of sorghum 
growers provided by village chiefs. Three households were later dropped from the analysis 
when they proved not to be sorghum growers, giving a final sample size of 297 households. 
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Table 1: Smart Logistics groups sampled for grower survey, Kitui district, 2012-2013 
Cluster Group Year 
established 
Members (no.) 
 
Sample (no.) 
Female Male Total Female Male Total 
Kanduti 
Farmers  
Field 
School, 
Nzambani 
district 
Kanduli 
Savings 
 and Credit 
2008 16 8 24 6 4 10 
Wendo Self 
Help 
2008 15 10 25 5 5 10 
Maoseo Tyaa 
Self Help 
2001 18 7 25 6 4 10 
Umisyo Self 
Help 
2008 22 3 25 8 2 10 
Twekanie Self 
Help 
2009 20 5 25 7 3 10 
Maliku 
Cereal  
Growers 
Association, 
Katulani 
district 
Wendo wa 
Maliku 
2003 13 3 16 8 2 10 
Kalimani 
women’s  
2006 24 0 24 10 0 10 
Umisyo wa w’o  
Self Help 
2008 22 0 22 10 0 10 
Kalimani Youth   2002 13 3 16 8 2 10 
Maliku Cotton 
Growers 
2000 14 19 33 4 6 10 
Kawongo 
Cereal  
Growers 
Association, 
Lower Yatta 
district 
Kyama Kya 
mavata 
2000 16 3 19 8 2 10 
Wendo wa 
Ikuuni 
1994 12 8 20 5 5 10 
Tiva Self Help 2000 14 7 21 6 4 10 
Kyambusya 
adult class 
2000 27 6 33 8 2 10 
Ushindi Self 
Help 
2005 10 7 17 5 5 10 
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A survey questionnaire was designed and pretested in all three clusters. The questionnaire 
covered the 2012 agricultural year, including both the short and long rains (October-
December 2012 and March-June 2012, respectively). In Kitui county sorghum is mostly 
grown in the short rains because rainfall is more reliable. The survey was conducted by 12 
Kikamba-speaking enumerators in June 2013, in order to capture income from sorghum 
sales made in early 2013. Information on partial budgets for Gadam sorghum was obtained 
from interviews with six purposively selected farmers in Smart Logistics groups (two per 
cluster) who had received training in sorghum production. 
2.4 Social inclusion 
Selection criteria for membership of Smart Logistics groups were obtained from interviews 
with leaders of three Smart Logistics clusters. The grower survey also asked non-members 
why they had not joined a Smart Logistics group. Finally, regression analysis was used to 
analyze the socio-economic variables that determined inclusion in Smart Logistics group. Of 
the 297 sorghum growers in the sample, 150 were members of Smart Logistics groups and 
of the 147 non-members, 75 were sorghum sellers while 72 were non-sellers. Logistic 
regression was used to estimate the importance of 10 inclusion indicators for members (150 
households) and non-members (147 households). Multinomial logistic regression was also 
used to estimate the importance of inclusion indicators for members compared to non-
member sellers and non-member-sellers. 
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3. Why sorghum beer? 
3.1 Factors influencing emergeance of sorghum beer 
3.1 The emergence of sorghum beer in Kenya was the result of a combination of factors, on 
both the supply and demand sides (Table 2). In this section, we analyze the role that each of 
these factors played in the development of sorghum beer. 
Sorghum beer is relatively new in Kenya. Kenya’s first locally-produced sorghum beer – 
Senator – was released in 2003. Disappointing sales of Senator led to the launch in 2004 of 
Senator keg. As the name suggests this was an un-bottled sorghum beer targeted at 
‘aspirational’ consumers wanting to ‘trade up’ from home-brewed drinks but could not afford 
bottled beers made from more expensive malted barley. Senator keg is marketed as an 
‘intermediate’ product that does not compete with EABL’s flagship brands. According to Euro 
monitor, Senator Keg is the second-most popular beer in Kenya, commanding 15.3 per cent 
of the beer market by volume in 2011 and has earned EABL $380 million in net sales1. 
 
 
1
 Hustlers now mourn tax hike on Senator Keg in the 2013/14 Kenya Budget. Standard Digital, 15 
June 2013. 
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Table 2: Timeline for sorghum beer in Kenya, 1993-2013 
1992 General and Presidential elections, December  
1993 Government increases combined taxes on beer to 153% per unit   
1993-2003 Beer consumption in Kenya falls from 14 to 8 litres per capita 
1997 EABL launches ‘Citizen’ Lager, a non-malted, bottled barley beer 
1998 SAB Miller enters Kenyan beer market with subsidiary Castle Brewing, Thika 
2002 SAB Miller exits Kenyan beer market 
2003 EABL launches ‘Senator’ a non-malted barley beer, for $0.33 per 300 ml 
bottle  
2004 Government reduces excise tax for non-malted keg beer to 30 % 
2004 EABL re-launches ‘Senator’ as ‘Senator Keg’ for $0.27 per 300 ml glass 
2006 Government reduces excise tax for non-malted keg beer by 100 % 
2007 General and presidential elections, December 
2008 Production of ‘Senator Keg’ overtakes production of ‘Tusker’ 
2009 EABL buys a majority stake in Serengeti Breweries, Tanzania 
2010 Production of ‘Senator Keg’ reaches 2 million hectolitres 
2013 General and presidential elections, March 
2013 Government introduces 50 % excise duty on non-malted keg beer 
2013 Alcoholic Drinks Control (Amendment) Bill 2010 (the ‘Mutotho law’) restricts 
drinking hours and legalizes licensed production of bottled chang’aa  
3.1.1 Falling consumer demand 
Sorghum beer was launched as an attempt to halt falling sales. Beer production in Kenya 
grew rapidly after independence in 1963, but there was a steep fall in beer production after 
1993, from 368 million litres in 1992 to 184 million litres in 2001 (Figure 2). Production did 
not begin to recover until 2004. Falling production reflected declining demand for beer. One 
reason for falling demand was rising prices. The real price of bottled beer (deflated by the 
retail price of maize grain) fell steadily in the 1960s and 1970s. However, prices have 
increased since the mid-1980s. In 2010, the price of a bottle of beer was equivalent to 3.9 kg 
of maize, up from just 1.1 kg of maize in 1980. Since 2000, however, average beer 
consumption has risen despite rising real prices, from 11 litres/adult in 2002 to 18 litres/adult 
in 2011. 
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Figure 2: Recorded beer consumption per head and the real price of beer in Kenya, 
1963-2011 (3 year moving averages). 
 
Source: Kenya Statistical Abstracts, various years. 
Rising prices reflected declining consumer income, and also higher excise taxes on beer. 
Real income per head fell throughout the 1990s, and did not recover until 2003. In 2006, real 
income per head averaged KES 34,000, the same level as in 1990. This ‘lost decade’ 
reduced disposable income and encouraged consumers to search for cheaper sources of 
alcohol, particularly illicit brews. Higher excise taxes reflected the government’s failure to 
generate tax revenue from other sources. Following President Moi’s election victory in 1992, 
taxation on bottled beer rose to 153 % per unit. (It was no accident that Moi’s nearest rival 
for the Presidency was Kenneth Matiba, a former chairman of EABL, and that EABL had 
openly supported multi-party elections). As a result, the share of beer in total excise revenue 
rose sharply, from just 16 % in 1989 to 59 % in 1994, and has remained at between 50-60 % 
of excise revenue to this day (Figure 3). In consequence, excise taxes also rose as a share 
of total tax revenue, from contributing about one-tenth of tax revenue in the 1980s to as 
much as one fifth in the 1990s. Higher excise taxes were passed on directly to consumers 
who were already struggling to meet higher living costs. 
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Figure 3: Beer excise, excise revenue and total tax revenue in Kenya, 1962-2011.   
 
Source: Kenya Statistical Abstracts, various years. 
3.1.2 Rising production costs 
Devaluation of the Kenya shilling in the 1990s raised the cost of imported malt, while the 
price of barley also rose sharply in the 1990s relative to the price of sorghum (Figure 4). 
Although barley is produced in Kenya, price fluctuations encouraged EABL to search for 
cheaper alternatives.  In addition, sorghum can be used to produce beer directly without the 
added cost of malting. According to EABL, replacing barley with sorghum cut production 
costs by 20-30 %. 
Figure 4: Producer prices for sorghum and barley in Kenya, 1980-2008 
 
Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators. 
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3.1.3 Increased competition 
After independence in 1963 EABL swiftly bought out smaller breweries and enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly until 1998, when SAB Miller bought Castle Brewing in Thika. This sparked a ‘Beer 
War’ between EABL and SABMiller. Competition between EABL and SABMiller for Kenya’s 
shrinking beer market hurt revenues and intensified the pressure on EABL to make a 
cheaper beer. The ‘Beer war’ ended with a truce in 2002 when SABMiller sold Castle 
Brewing to EABL, which promptly closed it down. In return, EABL closed Kibo Breweries in 
Moshi, Tanzania, with SABMiller agreeing to distribute EABL beers in Tanzania and EABL 
agreeing to distribute SABMiller beers in Kenya.  
Another source of competition was ‘new generation’ or ‘power drinks (Willis, 2003). These 
emerged as a direct response to higher prices for bottled beer. Although packaged as 
‘modern’ drinks, they were classed as ‘traditional’, and attracted an excise tax of just 10%. In 
terms of alcohol content, ‘power drinks’ were four to five times cheaper than EABL’s ‘Citizen’ 
lager and successfully competed for the lower end of the market. Although EABL 
successfully lobbied for a government ban on ‘power drinks’ in 1998, this proved impossible 
to enforce. At the same time, the government lifted the ban on the manufacture of palm 
wine, a favorite on the coast (Willis, 2009). Clearly, the lack of a consistent or effective policy 
towards illegal alcohol meant that EABL had to compete on price.  
3.1.4 Tax breaks 
A key factor in Senator’s success was the tax break granted to non-malted beers. Market 
research by EABL revealed that 56 % of alcohol consumption consisted of traditional 
fermented brews (busaa) or distilled spirits (chang’aa), which were illegal and therefore 
untaxed. Eliminating excise duty would encourage consumers to switch to Senator keg, 
boost sales of legal beer, and allow government to collect some of the tax lost from the sale 
of illicit brews. In 2004 the government granted a remission of 30 % on excise duty, 
increased to 100 % in 2006.  This allowed Senator keg to be sold at $0.20 per 300 ml glass, 
the same price as most illicit brews. The tax break on Senator Keg lasted until 2013, when 
the government re-imposed an excise duty of 50 %, on the grounds that ‘it has been difficult 
administratively to differentiate between various beer products and Senator keg, thereby 
posing a threat to revenue collection’2  Beer made from sorghum, millet and cassava 
continued to enjoy full remission in excise duty, however.3 Just as the decision to raise 
excise duty on beer followed elections in December 1992, so the decision to impose excise 
duty on sorghum beer followed elections in March 2013. Election expenses and salary 
increases for public-sector workers made it imperative to increase government revenues.4 
Excise duty on sorghum beer was expected to generate an additional KES 6.2 billion in tax 
revenue. As a result, the price of Senator keg rose from KES 20 to between KES 45-50 per 
300 ml glass. According to EABL, the price increase cut sales of Senator keg by 80 %.5 
 
2
 Budget Speech 13th June 2013, paragraph 78.  
http://www.citizennews.co.ke/news/2012/local/item/11232-budget-2013-2014-speech-by-henry-rotich 
3
 ‘EABL sees sales drop after new tax measures on Senator Keg’. Business Daily Jan 23 2014. 
4
 By 2013 the wage bill for the public sector consumed 54 % of total government revenue. Daily 
Nation, March 11, 2014. 
5
 ‘EABL targets Senator market with Sh10 spirit’. Business Daily, January 23, 2014. 
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Falling sales forced EABL to reduce production at its main Nairobi plant in Ruaraka from 
seven to five days a week.6 
3.1.5 Health scares 
An important factor in the government’s decision to remit excise tax for Senator keg was the 
health risk posed by illicit brews. Higher prices for bottled beer encouraged consumers to 
search for cheaper alternatives. Cases of poisoning from ‘power’ drinks or from chang’aa 
captured the headlines.7 The government was blamed for taxing beer beyond the reach of 
poorer consumers. The Ministry of Health supported EABL’s campaign for tax breaks on 
non-malted beers, on public health grounds (Ogola and Mungai, 2011b: 6). Conversely, one 
of the reasons given for re-instating excise tax on Senator keg in 2013 was that it had not 
reduced consumption of chang’aa. 
3.1.6 The future for sorghum beer 
Sorghum beer in Kenya has been described as a win-win-win story: bigger sales for EABL, 
cheaper, safer beer for ordinary Kenyans, and more tax revenue for government (EABL, 
2013). However, events have not exactly followed this script. True, Senator keg has boosted 
beer sales in Kenya, and helped EABL recover from the drop in beer production following 
the hike in excise duty on beer in 1993. Increased sales have also produced more corporate 
and value added tax for the government, although whether this has compensated for the 
remission in excise duty is unclear. Finally, consumers have benefitted from cheaper beer. 
However, although EABL claimed that Senator keg had captured half the market for illicit 
brews (EABL, 2013), no research has been conducted to evaluate its impact on public 
health. Although Senator keg was competitively priced with chang’aa, the higher alcohol 
content of illicit brews makes them more attractive to poorer consumers. In a tacit admission 
that this strategy had failed, in 2010 the government legalized the manufacture and sale of 
bottled chang’aa. Following the decline in sales of Senator keg as the result of higher prices, 
EABL’s new marketing strategy to attract poorer consumers has been to develop a cheaper 
brand of spirits.8 Thus, the success of sorghum beer in Kenya rested on fragile foundations 
that could crumble overnight if government changed its mind over the benefits from reduced 
taxation.  
  
 
6
 ‘EABL stops daily brewing as growth hits a four-year low’, Business Daily, March 13, 2014. 
7
 Poisoning from chang’aa resulted from adulteration with jet fuel, methanol, battery acid, and 
embalming fluid. Less lethal ingredients reportedly included decomposing rats and women’s 
underpants. ‘Kill me quick: Kenya’s lethal brew deserves its name’. The Economist, April 29
th
 2010. 
8
 ‘EABL targets Senator Market with Sh10 spirit’. Business Daily, January 23, 2014. 
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4. The value chain  
4.1 Mapping the value chain 
The value chain for sorghum beer includes a variety of actors (Figure 5). The first row 
functions in the value chain (arrows) with operators in the two centre rows (rectangles) and 
support service providers on bottom row (sim-card rectangles). An ‘operator’ is as an actor 
that takes ownership of the product at some stage in the value chain, to distinguish them 
from service providers. ‘Operational service providers’ provide services to specific operators 
(eg. transporters), while ‘support service providers’ provide services at the meso-level (eg. 
agricultural research). Vertical arrows show the linkages between actors in the value chain. 
The position of the service provider in relation to the functions shows which specific 
operators they support.   
4.1.1. KARI Seed Unit 
Sorghum beer is made from Gadam, a semi-dwarf sorghum variety with specific market 
traits, including white colour, low tannin and a high starch content. Originating in Sudan, 
Gadam was officially introduced in Kenya as a food crop in 1972 but then re-launched as an 
industrial crop in eastern Kenya in 2004. The KARI Seed Unit, located at Katumani, was 
established to grow and market seed of open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) that were 
unprofitable for private seed companies. It is the biggest producer of sorghum seed in 
Kenya. The Seed Unit sub-contracts seed production to 3000 growers who are advanced 
seed and repay in kind after harvest. The minimum acreage for a contract farmer is five 
acres. The Seed Unit buys whatever quantity farmers want to sell, provided it passes seed 
inspection by KEPHIS. Sales are made to large buyers but not to stockists because of risk of 
adulteration with inferior seed. In 2011, KARI bought 600 t of Gadam seed from contracted 
growers. 
4.1.2 Sorghum growers 
Sorghum is grown principally in semi-arid areas of Eastern, Nyanza and parts of Coastal 
region of Kenya. The crop performs well in areas of 500-1700 m above sea level (asl) with 
seasonal rainfall of 300 mm and above. In Eastern region production is concentrated in Kitui, 
Makueni and Machakos counties, Meru and Tharaka. Between 1990 and 2012 the trend in 
production was positive, but with large fluctuations, which reflected fluctuations in the area 
harvested. Since 2009, however, there has been a steady increase in production, primarily 
because of the growing demand for sorghum for brewing. 
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Figure 5: Value chain map for sorghum beer, Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Inputs Production Trade Processing Consumption 
KARI Seed
Unit 
Private 
stockists 
Growers Smart 
Logistics  
Brokers  
EAML  
          EABL 
Senator Keg 
distributors 
KARI 
ICRISAT 
MoA 
Agriculture 
KARI 
EUCORD 
Ministry 
of Health 
Consumers 
Equity 
Bank 
Treasury 
Parliament 
Retail Wholesale 
Senator       
Keg bars 
The value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya 
 
                                                                            ICRISAT - Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 18 
Figure 6: Sorghum production in Kenya, 1990-2012. 
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
4.1.3 Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd. 
Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd. is a private Kenyan owned company established in 2006. In 
2011, it purchased 2,000 t of Gadam sorghum, of which 1,500 t came directly from growers 
selling to aggregation centres and 500 t from its own appointed agents. Growers who use 
aggregation centres are paid by Equity Bank either through personal bank or M-pesa 
accounts.  By contrast, agents pay on the spot and hence supplement the company’s 
working capital. Sorghum from the aggregation centres is bulked at a central warehouse in 
Machakos before delivery to East Africa Maltings Limited (EAML). In 2102, Smart Logistics 
sourced sorghum from 1,500 small scale sorghum farmers organized into marketing groups.  
4.1.4 East African Breweries Limited 
The market for beer in Kenya is dominated by Kenya Breweries Ltd, a subsidiary of East 
African Breweries (EABL), which has an estimated 93 % market share. EABL is a subsidiary 
of Diageo plc (50% stake), while 50 % is state-owned through the Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation (ICDC). In the 2012 financial year, the brewer’s sorghum demand 
reached 24,000 t, of which Kenyan growers supplied 8,000 t, with the balance met by 
imports. Sorghum sourced from farmers by Smart Logistics and other agents is delivered to 
EAML, one of the EABL Group of companies, which supplies quality raw materials for 
brewing. 
4.1.5 Distributors 
East African Breweries Limited appoints distributors who supply only their products. Each 
distributor serves a specific area. In order to differentiate Senator from EABL’s premium 
brands, distributors for Senator keg and keg spirits do not distribute Tusker or Guinness. To 
qualify as a distributor for Senator keg and keg spirits, distributors must have a bank 
guarantee of KES 10 million and start-up capital of KES 10 million.  
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4.1.6 Retailers 
Retailers selling Senator keg buy from the distributors and sell in 500 ml and 300 ml mugs. 
Customers are primarily low income earners in surrounding area. For the bar interviewed 
(Sky Pub bar), the main customers were mainly male casual workers, both old and young. 
4.2 Value addition 
4.2.1 Sorghum growers 
Partial budgets for the 2012 growing season are shown in Table 3. Labour costs were 
calculated based on a wage rate of KES.250 per day for men, KES 200 for women, and KES 
75 per day for children. Most sorghum growers used only family labour. First weeding, bird 
scaring and harvesting were the only activities for which farmers hired labour. Exchange 
labour was rarely used. Consequently, there was a big difference between the cash-cost of 
labour (1,120 KES/acre) and the full-cost (13,725 KES/acre). Bird-scaring was the single 
most important labour cost (41%). Farmers reported receiving seed for free, but the market 
rate for a 2 kg pack required for one acre was estimated at KES 375. No farmer reported 
applying fertilizer or pesticides to sorghum. Typically, most farmers used their own or 
borrowed donkeys to transport sorghum to the market or collection centres. For households 
living nearer the collection centres, women carried the sorghum on their backs.  
Gross revenue was estimated at 6,250 KES/acre. On a cash-cost basis, the gross margin for 
sorghum was 4,755 KES/acre or 19 KES/kg. However, on a full-cost basis, the gross margin 
was -7,970 KES/acre or -0.56 KES/kg, showing that farmers lost half of every shilling 
invested. Value added (D) was calculated by the sales revenue which is the total value 
generated (A) less the cost of hired labour.  
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Table 3: Value added by Gadam sorghum growers, Kitui district, 2012 season 
(KES/acre)   
(A) Sales Value Quantity Unit Price/unit Total 
Yield 250 Kg 25 6250 
(B) Inputs     
Seed 2.5 kgs 150 375 
Fertilizer 0 0 0 0 
Manure 0 0 0 0 
Bags 3 number 40 120 
Pesticides 0 0 0 0 
(C) Other Inputs     
Labour   Family 
(mandays) 
Hired 
(mandays) 
Exchange 
(mandays) 
Total 
Land preparation- oxen 3 0 0 3 
Land preparation-hoe 0 0 0 0 
Manure application 0 0 0 0 
Planting 1.6 0 0 1.6 
Replanting 0 0 0 0 
Fertilizer application 0 0 0 0 
1st weeding 6.2 1 0 7.2 
2nd weeding 3.6 0 0 3.6 
3rd weeding 0 0 0 0 
Spraying 0 0 0 0 
Bird scaring 20.3 2 0 22.3 
Harvesting 4.1 1 2 7.1 
Carrying produce 1.6 0 1 2.6 
Drying 0.8 0 0 0.8 
Threshing 2.9 0 1 3.9 
Winnowing 1.6 0 0 1.6 
Bagging 0.4 0 0 0.4 
Transporting to 
aggregation centre 
0.8 0 0 0.8 
Total labour hours 46.9 4 4 54.9 
 Full-costs  Cash-costs  
Wages (labour costs) 13,725  1,120  
(D) Value added     
Value added per acre 6250  5130  
Value added per kg of 
grain 
25.0  20.5  
Note: KES 85.0 = US $ 1 
4.2.2 Smart Logistics 
Table 4 shows value added by Smart Logistics. In the 2012 season, it bought Gadam at 25 
KES/kg. Intermediate inputs included the cost of the raw material and operational services 
(transport). Smart Logistics added value of 5.5 KES/kg or 22% of the buying price. Profit was 
estimated at 2 KES/kg. Profitability therefore depended on high volumes. 
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Table 4: Value added by Smart Logistics (Oct-Dec, 2012) (KES/kg) 
(A) Sales Value  
Price of sorghum grain 32 
(B) Intermediate Goods  
Cost of Sorghum grain 25 
Transport  1.0 
Cess 0.5 
Total 26.5 
(C) Other Inputs  
(D) Value added  
Aggregation  1.0 
Loading and offloading 1.0 
Administration 1.0 
Handling losses (pouring, weight loss) 0.5 
Profit  2.0 
Total Value added 5.5 
Source: Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd. 
Note: KES 85 = US $ 1 
4.2.3 East African Breweries Limited 
EABL buys Gadam sorghum from Smart Logistics and other suppliers at 32 KES/kg. One 50 
litre barrel of sorghum beer is sold to distributors at 4,289 KES/barrel, giving a sale price of 
86 KES/litre.  EABL did not provide information on the cost of intermediate inputs or value 
added. One brew of sorghum beer (80,000 litres) requires 11 t of sorghum grains, so 1 kg of 
sorghum grain produces 7.27 litres of beer. Therefore, the cost of raw material to produce 
one brew is KES 352,000. The sale price of one brew is KES 6,862,400. The revenue from 1 
kg of sorghum grain is therefore KES 624 (KES 6,862,400 /11t).  
4.2.4 Senator Keg Distributors 
Table 5 shows value addition for Senator keg distributors. In 2012, distributors bought a 50 
litre keg for KES 2,780. After the imposition of excise duty in September, 2013, the price 
rose to KES 5,200 per keg. From January 2014, the price has dropped to KES 4,289 per 
keg. In 2012, the retail price was KES 3,040 per barrel. After the excise duty imposition it 
rose to KES 5,325, and currently one 50 litre barrel sells at KES 4,537. In 2012, Jukoma 
Enterprises bought 6,000 barrels per month. Since the imposition of excise duty, this has 
fallen to 900 barrels per month, representing an 85% drop in sales of Senator keg.  
Operation costs for Jukoma average 81,760 KES/month, with licenses paid annually. 
Distributors buy at KES 4289 per 50 litre barrel and sell at KES 4537. The value added was 
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KES 226 per barrel. To convert to sorghum grain, we converted to litres, and divided litres by 
7.27, since 1 kg of sorghum grain gives 7.27 litres of sorghum beer.  
Table 5: Value added by Senator keg distributors (KES) 
(A)Sales Value 
 
Per 900 barrels Per 50 
litre barrel  
Per kg of 
sorghum 
grain 
Revenue from Keg per 
month 
900 barrels 
@ 4537 
4,083,300 4537 660 
(B) Intermediate Goods     
Cost of Keg purchase per 
month 
900 barrels 
@ 4289  
3,860,100 4289 624 
- Liquor license  2500 2.77 0.38 
- Council license  1000 1.11 0.15 
- Health license  260 0.29 0.04 
- Electricity  1500 1.67 0.23 
- Petrol (transport)  14400 16.0 2.29 
Total  3,879,760 4311 627.1 
(C) Other Inputs     
(D) Value added     
Operation cost accrued by 
Senator keg per month 
(60% of total cost) 
 
    
- Labour  19200 2.11 0.29 
- Rent  42000 46.7 6.42 
- Truck maintenance  900 1.0 0.14 
- Profit  141,440 157.2 21.62 
Total Value Added  203,540 226.2 28.47 
Note: KES 85=1USD 
4.2.5 Senator keg retailers  
Table 6 shows value added by Senator Keg retailers. In 2012 retailers used to sell a 300ml 
mug for KES 25 and a 500 ml mug for KES 40. After the imposition of excise duty the price 
rose to KES 35 for a 300 ml mug and KES 60 for a 500 ml mug. Before the imposition of 
excise duty, this bar sold 100 barrels per month; currently it sells only 30 barrels of Senator 
keg per month. Senator keg accounted for about 60 % of total sales.  Retailers buy Senator 
keg from distributors at KES 4,537 per 50 litre barrel and sell at KES 5,000 per barrel. Most 
costs have either stayed constant or increased. Intermediate costs averaged KES 4,709 per 
50 litre barrel. Value added averaged KES 291 per barrel, and profits were negative at KES -
169 per barrel. To convert to sorghum grain, we converted to litres, and divided litres by 
7.27, since 1 kg of sorghum grain gives 7.27 litres of sorghum beer.  
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Table 6: Value added by Senator Keg retailers (KES) 
(A) Sales Value 
 
Per 30 
barrels 60% 
of total costs 
Per 50 litre 
barrel 
Per kg of 
sorghum 
grain 
Revenue from Keg per 
month 
30 barrels @ 
5,000 
150,000 5,000 727 
(B) Intermediate Goods     
Cost of Keg purchase 
per month 
30 barrels @ 
4,537  
136,110 4,537 660 
- Liquor license  1500 50.0 7.27 
- Health license  215 7.17 1.04 
- Council license  210 7.00 1.02 
- Electricity  900 30.0 4.36 
- Water   1800 60.0 8.72 
- Transport  540 18.0 2.62 
- Total  141,275 4709 684.7 
(C) Other Inputs     
(D) Value added     
- Labour   4800 160.0 23.26 
- Rent  9000 300.0 43.62 
- Profit  -5,075 -169.2 -23.27 
Total value added  8725 290.8 43.61 
Source: Sky Pub bar, Kiambu, Nairobi. Note: KES 85=1 USD 
4.2.6 Value addition for sorghum beer   
Figure 7 shows value addition for the value chain for sorghum beer. To compare the benefits 
received by different actors, value addition is expressed per kg of sorghum grain. Brewing 
adds the most value to sorghum grain. EABL buys one kg of sorghum at 32 KES/kg and 
after transformation into beer the same kg of sorghum sells for 624 KES/kg. Consequently, 
the share of value added is unequally distributed. Sorghum growers receive 3 % of final 
price. The lion’s share accrues to brewers, distributors and retailers, with EABL receiving 81 
%. Growers do better in terms of profitability, making 21 Ks/kg or 84 % of the sale price. We 
cannot estimate profitability for EABL, since brewing costs are not known. However, profits 
may not be excessive given intermediate costs and the cost of wages. Profitability is 
negative for Senator bars reflecting the price rise that followed the imposition of excise duty. 
4.3 Challenges faced by value chain actors 
4.3.1 KARI Seed Unit 
 Large carry over stock due to decline in demand, owing to end of MoA’s “Orphan 
Seed Programme”; and  
 Adulteration by traders who mix seeds from KARI with other seeds. 
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4.3.2 Smart Logistics Solutions Ltd. 
 Risks of drought which make farmers to keep the little sorghum they have harvested 
for home consumption;  
 Competition from spot buyers;  
 Mistrust where some farmers felt they would not be paid; and 
 High cost of trade finance for buying sorghum. 
4.3.3 East African Breweries 
 More raw materials required for sorghum beer brewing (sugar, and yeast) because of 
low carbohydrates in sorghum as compared to barley; 
 Yeast in sorghum cannot be re-used as in barley; and 
Sorghum has a ‘recognizable taste’ and as a result it is used in only one brand (Senator 
keg). The other beer brands are brewed with barley. EAML, a subsidiary of EABL mandated 
in sourcing raw materials for brewing identified the following as their main challenges:  
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Figure 7. Distribution of revenue and value along the value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya (per kg of sorghum grain) 
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Price received 
(KES/kg of sorghum) 
25 32 624 660 727 
Share of final price 3 % 1 % 81% 5 % 9 % 
Intermediate goods 
(KES/kg) 
Nil Sorghum grain: 25 
Transport: 1.0 
Cess: 0.5 
Total: 26.5 
Sorghum grain: 32  
Sugar: NA 
Water: NA 
Bottles: NA 
Caps: NA 
Other ingredients: NA 
Sorghum grain: 624 
Liquor licence: 0.38 
Council licence: 0.11 
Health licence: 0.04 
Electricity: 0.23 
Petrol: 2.29 
Total: 627.1 
Sorghum grain: 660 
Liquor licence: 7.27 
Council licence: 1.04 
Health licence: 4.36 
Electricity: 8.72 
Petrol: 2.62 
Total: 684.7 
Value addition 
(Kes/kg) 
Hired labour : 4.0 
Profit: 21.0 
Total 25.0 
Wages: 3.0  
Handling losses: 0.5 
Profit: 2.0 
Total: 5.5  
Wages: NA 
Rent: NA 
Interest: NA 
Depreciation: NA 
Profit: NA 
Wages: 0.29 
Rent: 6.42 
Truck repair: 0.14 
Profit: 21.62 
Total: 28.47 
Wages: 23.26 
Rent: 43.62 
Profit: -23.27 
Total: 43.61 
Intermediate costs 
(%) 
0 % 83 % NA 95 % 94 % 
Value added (%) 100 % 17 % NA 5 % 6 % 
Note: KES 85 = 1 USD 
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 Unable to source enough sorghum from Kenya, and high import costs due to import 
taxes; 
 Poor quality of sorghum from some farmers; and 
 Have to work with small-scale farmers who face agronomic disadvantages (bird 
scaring, spacing, and weeding). 
4.3.4 Senator keg distributors 
Major challenges mentioned by the distributors arise from the imposition of excise duty in 
September 2013: 
 Low sales volumes, with decrease of 85 %  in volume of sales;  
 Have had to retrench some staff; 
 Some bars have closed down or stopped selling Senator keg; 
 High cost of doing business and lack of access to credit due to high interest rates; 
and 
 Difficulties delivering Senator keg during the wet season because access roads to 
bars are impassable. 
4.3.5 Senator keg retailers 
 Low sales volume after the price increase; 
 Confrontations when customers refuse to leave the bar at the new closing time of 
2200 hrs; 
 Retrenchment of staff; and 
 High cost of liquor licenses. 
4.3.6 Growers 
Smart Logistics groups reported their main problem as the length of time required for 
payment (37 %), followed by low buying price (26 %)  (Table 7). Although Smart Logistics 
offers a higher price than other buyers, members felt the buying price did not compensate for 
the labour required to grow sorghum, particularly since most operations are done by hand. 
This is clearly linked to the third most important problem of ‘no threshing machine’ (19 % of 
growers). Although the labour required for threshing (3.9 mandays/acre) is less than required 
for weeding or bird-scaring (Table 3), the operation is dusty and unpleasant. 
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Table 7: Problems reported by members of Smart Logistics Groups 
Problem 
Weighted 
Frequency 
Weighted 
(%) 
Payment takes too long 37 28.0 
Buying price is too low 34 25.8 
No threshing machines 25 18.9 
Gadam seeds arrive late 10 7.6 
The collection centres are too far away 7 5.3 
Not enough training on sorghum production  7 5.3 
High charges for payments though bank or Mpesa  4 3.0 
Have to buy sacks from Smart Logistics 4 3.0 
Gadam seeds are poor quality 2 1.5 
Others 2 1.5 
Smart Logistics did not return our sacks 1 0.8 
Total 132 100 
Table 8 provides more information on time of payment. Only 5% of farmers were paid within 
the target of one week set by Smart Logistics. The majority of farmers (37%) were paid after 
four or five weeks, while a minority (6.1%) had to wait three months. The average waiting 
time was 4.5 weeks. This explains why ‘payment takes too long’ was ranked as the most 
important problem for growers selling to Smart Logistics (Table 7). The most popular method 
of payment was by ‘Own Mpesa account’ 9 used by 24 % of group members. Although Smart 
Logistics encourages members to have their own bank or Mpesa accounts, 64 % of 
members were paid in cash or through second party accounts. This highlights the 
importance of trust, which was cited as an important criterion for group membership. 
Table 8: Timeliness and mode of payment (n=115) 
Payment after 
delivery 
(weeks) Frequency Percent Method of payment Frequency Percent 
1 5 4.3 Own Mpesa account 27 23.5 
2-3 30 26.1 
Bank account of another 
group member 
 
23 20 
4-5 43 37.4 Group bank account 19 16.5 
6-7 17 14.8 Own bank account 17 14.8 
8-9 7 6.1 Cash 12 12.2 
10-11 4 3.5 
Mpesa account of 
another group member 
 
11 10.4 
12 2 1.7 
Bank account of other 
relative 5 4.3 
Not paid 7 6.1 Spouse's bank account 1 0.8 
Total 115 100.0 Total 115 100.0 
 
9
 A mobile-phone based electronic money transfer and micro-financing service. It comes from the 
Kiswahili word ‘pesa’ meaning money. 
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5. The grower survey  
5.1 Socio economic profile  
Although Smart Logistics works primarily with groups, non-members (20%) also sold Gadam 
through a Smart Logistics group. We divided the sample households into three groups for 
analysis: members of Smart Logistics groups, non-members of Smart Logistics groups who 
sell sorghum, and non-members who do not sell sorghum. The rationale for this grouping is 
that a high proportion of households that were not group members nevertheless sold 
sorghum through a Smart Logistics group, using a friend or relative to make the sale. 
Table 9 provides a socio-economic profile of these three household groups. No significant 
differences were found in household characteristics (female heads, age, household size, 
number of adults and children, and education) between the three groups. However, 
members owned significantly more land per capita (1.52 acres) than non-members. Non-
member sellers had the smallest own land per capita (0.95 acres) and to compensate 
borrowed or rented-in more land (1.36 acres) than others.  
As expected, the area planted to sorghum was significantly higher for members (1.71 acres), 
but the area planted to maize did not differ significantly across the groups. Unexpectedly, 
sorghum production was highest among non-members sellers (688 kg/household) compared 
to 483 kg/household for members. Likewise, the quantity of sorghum sold was also highest 
among non-member sellers (517 kg/household) compared to 305 kg/household for 
members. There were a few members who did not sell their sorghum in the last season, 
which could be the reason why the sorghum sold per household for members was lower 
than for non-members. There was no significant difference in adult participation rate in 
sorghum production between the groups. 
Household income from crops was significantly higher for non-member sellers compared to 
the other two groups (66,641 KES/household compared to 48,679 KES/household for 
members and 42,834 KES/household for non-sellers).There were no significant differences 
in other household incomes across the three categories; neither were there significant 
differences in the asset values. 
Significantly more non-member sellers (83%) bought maize as compared to members’ and 
non-members non-sellers. Likewise, the average number of months that a household 
purchased maize was higher for the non-member sellers (5.9 months) compared to 5.6 
months for non-members non-sellers and 4.9 for the members. Group members bought 
maize less frequently because they kept more maize to eat (725.3 kg/household), compared 
to 315 kg/household and 405 kg/household for non-member sellers and non-member non-
sellers, respectively. 
  
The value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya 
 
                                                                            ICRISAT - Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 29 
Table 9: Socio-economic profile of sorghum growers 
 
Variable  
 
Members 
(n=150) 
Non members  
Sig. 
Level 
(p<) 
Sellers 
(n=75) 
Non 
sellers 
(n=72) 
Household characteristics 
    
Female headed households (no.) 63 
(42.0)a 
39 
(52.0) 
51 
(70.8) 
0.275 
Age of household head (no.) 53 
(14.3)b 
50 
(14.6) 
50 
(15.6) 
0.263 
 
Schooling of household head (years)  7.0 
(4.4) 
6.5 
(4.0) 
6.6 
(4.9) 
0.728 
Household size (no.) 6.5 
(2.71) 
6.3 
(2.13) 
6.2 
(2.14) 
0.531 
Adult members <15yrs (no.) 3.9 
(1.64) 
4.3 
(1.63) 
3.9 
(1.64) 
0.389 
Children >15yrs (no.) 2.2 
(0.55) 
2.2 
(1.66) 
2.5 
(1.74) 
0.545 
Land (acres)     
Owned land per capita  1.52 
(2.4) 
0.95 
(0.82) 
1.50 
(2.06) 
0.090* 
Land cultivated  5.17 
(4.13) 
5.00 
(4.21) 
4.65 
(3.94) 
0.722 
Borrowed/rented in land  0.92 
(1.75) 
1.36 
(2.69) 
0.65 
(1.34) 
0.080* 
Household food security     
Households purchasing maize (no.) 117 
(78.0) 
62 
(82.7) 
53 
(73.6) 
0.036** 
Months buying maize (no.) 4.85 
(3.6) 
5.9 
(3.0) 
5.60 
(4.1) 
0.086* 
Maize kept to eat (kg) 725 
(676) 
315 
(367) 
405 
(40) 
0.095 * 
Households purchasing sorghum (no.) 20 
(13.3) 
7 
(9.3) 
14 
(19.4) 
0.314 
Months buying sorghum (no.) 0.67 
(2.17 
0.95 
(2.52) 
0.42 
(1.44) 
0.317 
Sorghum kept to eat (kg) 281 
(322) 
108 
(40) 
79 
(23) 
0.265 
Cereal production     
Sorghum production (kg) 483 
(652) 
688 
(2519) 
107 
(134) 
0.033** 
Area planted to sorghum (acres) 1.71 
(1.73 
1.33 
(1.46) 
0.82 
(1.03) 
0.000*** 
Sorghum sold (kg) 305 517 0 0.043** 
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(601) (2344) (0) 
Maize production (kg) 899 
(1386) 
722 
(623) 
703 
(973) 
0.377 
Area planted to maize (acres) 2.43 
(1.87) 
2.53 
(1.76) 
2.55 
(1.95) 
0.876 
Adults (>15yrs) full time in sorghum production 
(no.) 
1.97 
(1.13) 
1.76 
(1.26) 
1.85 
(1.00) 
0.416 
Households that have increased area planted 
to sorghum (no.) 
90 
(60.0) 
33 
(44.0) 
31 
(43.1) 
0.004*** 
Income (000 KES)     
Crops 48.7 
(49.7) 
66.6 
(10.1) 
42.8 
(46.8) 
0.067* 
Livestock 150.1 
(170.5 
125.2 
(171.4) 
165.9 
(181.1) 
0.353 
Off-farm  72.4 
(122.8) 
67.0  
(98.8) 
102.5 
(229.6 
0.290 
Total 271.2 
(262.5) 
258.8 
(336.3) 
311.2 
(378.6) 
0.560 
Income per capita  49.4 
(58.5) 
45.6 
(50.8) 
54.8 
(68.5) 
0.638 
Notes: 
 a Percentages for numerical variables, Chi-square test for categorical variables 
 b standard deviation for quantitative variables,  ANOVA for continuous variables 
* 0.1 significance level, **0.05 significance level, ***0.01 significance level 
5.2 Sorghum production 
Only 51 % of fields planted to sorghum followed the recommended method of planting 
Gadam in pure stand. Forty-nine percent of fields planted to sorghum were intercropped 
either with green grams (35 %), cowpeas (28 %), maize (16 %) or pigeon peas (13%). Half 
the sample growers had increased the area planted to sorghum. The main reason reported 
for the increase in area was ‘to increase income’ (Table 10).  
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Table 10: Reasons for increasing area planted to sorghum (%) 
Reason Members 
(n=90) 
Non-members Total 
(155) 
  Sellers 
(n=33) 
Non-sellers 
(n=31) 
 
To increase income 28 24 32 27 
To increase production 24 21 29 
 
25 
Sorghum is high yielding 16 9 13 14 
Sorghum is profitable 16 18 7 14 
Sorghum is reliable 7 18 3 8 
Sorghum is drought resistant 7 9 0 6 
Use sorghum for food 4 0 16 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Chi-square p = 0.113  
Of the growers who reported no increase in the area planted to sorghum, 39 % claimed this 
was due to a shortage of land for cultivation, followed by not enough labour (32 %) (Table 
11). However, for non-sellers, the main constraint (43 % of growers) was not shortage of 
land but shortage of labour. Non-sellers were also more likely to report sorghum cultivation 
as unprofitable (37%). 
Table 11: Reasons for not increasing area planted to sorghum (%) 
Reason Non-members   
Sellers 
(n=42) 
Non-sellers 
(n=41) 
Members 
(n=60) 
Total 
(n=143) 
Not enough land 43 17 50 39 
Not enough 
labour 
26 43 27 32 
Not profitable 29 37 20 27 
High cost of seed 0 0 2 1 
 
Poor/unfavorable 
rains 
2 0 2 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Chi-square p = 0.05  
Scope for expanding the area planted to sorghum was limited by the need to grow maize 
and other crops for food security and cash income.  Half of the sampled sorghum growers 
(51%) estimated the frequency of poor maize harvests at four years out of five while 33% 
The value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya 
 
                                                                            ICRISAT - Socioeconomics Discussion Paper Series 32 
estimated this at three years out of five. In years when maize did not do well, households 
used several coping strategies. More than half of the households reported selling livestock or 
green grams, or relied on remittances from family members working in town. Fifty two 
percent of members used selling sorghum as a coping strategy after a poor maize harvest, 
compared to 21 % of non-members. 
Preferences for sorghum and maize were elicited by asking growers if they agreed or 
disagreed with certain statements (Table 12). Eight in 10 growers agreed that in drought 
years sorghum gave a higher yield than maize. Moreover, only one-third of growers believed 
that in a normal year maize gave higher yields than sorghum. Why then did growers persist 
in growing maize? The main reasons included taste (for both adults and children), ease of 
selling maize, and that maize needed less labour. Moreover, maize was always there in the 
market. Households that run out of food have no choice but to buy maize, which increases 
the incentive to plant maize to avoid forced maize purchases. Interestingly, sorghum non-
sellers believed that maize was easier to sell than sorghum. 
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Table 12: Maize and sorghum preferences 
 
Number agreeing that:  
 
Members 
(n=150) 
Non- members Sig. 
Level 
(p<) 
Sellers 
(n=75) 
Non sellers 
(n=72) 
Maize is always there in the market 
115 
(76.7%) 
63 
(84%) 
60 
(83.3%) 
.317 
Maize is cheaper to buy than 
sorghum 
20 
(13.3%) 
12 
(16%) 
8 
(11.1%) 
.685 
In a normal year, maize gives a 
higher yield than sorghum 
35 
(23.3%) 
24 
(32%) 
21 
(29.2%) 
.011** 
In a drought year, sorghum gives a 
higher yield than maize 
121 
(80.7%) 
63 
(84%) 
60 
(83.3%) 
.791 
Maize needs less labour than 
sorghum 
91 
(60.7%) 
62 
(82.7%) 
45 
(62.5%) 
.003*** 
Maize gives food earlier than 
sorghum 
21 
(14%) 
8 
(10.7%) 
16 
(22.2%) 
.127 
Maize has a higher sale price than 
sorghum 
83 
(55.3%) 
45 
(60%) 
52 
(72.2%) 
.054* 
Maize is easier to sell than sorghum 
99 
(66%) 
48 
(64%) 
58 
(80.6%) 
.050** 
Maize tastes better than sorghum 
108 
(72%) 
67 
(89.3%) 
67 
(93.1%) 
.000*** 
My children prefer ugali made from 
maize 
109 
(72.7%) 
65 
(86.7%) 
68 
(94.4%) 
.000*** 
My children prefer uji made from 
sorghum 
10 
(6.7%) 
1 
(1.3%) 
4 
(5.6%) 
.221 
* 0.1 significance level, **0.05 significance level, ***0.01 significance level 
The main labour constraint on sorghum cultivation was bird-scaring (60 %) followed by 
threshing (30 %) (Table 13). Bird scaring was conducted for two-three weeks from dawn to 
dusk before harvesting. The methods used have not changed for 100 years. Platforms are 
built that give a good view of the crop. Wires strung with empty tins are strung across the 
field, and pulled when birds appear. All categories cited threshing as the second most 
labour-intensive sorghum production activity. Threshing is labor-intensive because few 
farmers have access to threshing machines. Threshing was usually done at night to 
minimize exposure to direct sunlight which causes skin irritation. Among Smart Logistics 
groups with access to a threshing machine, some set a minimum production threshold (eg. 
500 kg) for growers who requested access to the machine. 
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The biggest problem is bird scaring, forcing farmers to plant a smaller area they can protect 
effectively. Since there is no cash to hire labour, members have to use family labour. Scaring 
is done mostly by adults since children are at school. Normally they have to scare birds for 
3-4 weeks per season, a full day from dawn to dusk. Birds are scared by stringing tin on 
wires that are stretched across the field; building platforms so that bird-scarers can see 
birds; hanging rags in the field; and by firing catapults. Birds eat less of the red sorghum, but 
they prefer Gadam, which is sweet. Kanduti Farmers Field School (March 2013). 
Table 13: Labour constraints in sorghum production (%) 
Activity Non-members   
 Sellers 
(n=75) 
Non-sellers 
(n=72) 
Members 
(n=150) 
Total 
Scaring birds 57 76 54 60 
Threshing 33 18 34 30 
Weeding 5 1 7 5 
Harvesting 4 3 3 3 
Ploughing 0 1 2 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Chi-square p = 0.110  
Weeding is a labor-intensive activity that must be completed within six weeks of planting. 
Weeding for both sorghum and maize was done chiefly with family labour (Table 14). No 
significant differences were found between the type of labour used to weed sorghum and 
maize, or between the type of labour for weeding used by members and non-members. 
Table 14: Labour use for weeding sorghum and maize (%) 
Type of labour Sorghum Maize 
 Members 
(n=148) 
Non- 
members 
(n=134) 
Total 
(n=280) 
Members 
(n=148) 
Non- 
members 
(n=146) 
Total 
(n=294) 
Family labour only 58 63 60 57 62 60 
Hired labour only 5 5 5 1 3 2 
Both family and 
hired 
30 29 30 32 31 32 
Exchange labour 
3 2 
 
3 3 1 
 
2 
Family and 
exchange labour 
2 2 2 6 2 4 
Family, hired and 
exchange labour 
1 0 1 0 1 
 
0 
 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Chi-square p = 0.140 (maize), p = 0.675 (sorghum) 
Table 15 compares crop management practices between members and non-members for 
sorghum and maize. We found few significant differences for sorghum. Since training 
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provided at the group demonstration plots is open to non-members, most growers know the 
recommended agronomic practices. None of the growers applied fertilizer because most 
believed that their fields had good soil fertility. However, non-members weeded sorghum 
more frequently than members (1.98 weedings compared to 1.88). They also weeded maize 
more frequently (2.08 times compared to 1.99). This may reflect labour shortage caused by 
the greater area that members planted to sorghum (Table 9). Members were more likely to 
plant sorghum on terraced fields (83 % compared to 71%). Maize was more likely than 
sorghum to be planted before the rains, and more likely than to be planted on fields 
considered to have good soil fertility. 
Table 15: Crop management practices for sorghum and maize 
Practice  Sorghum Maize 
Members 
(n=146) 
Non-
members 
(n=134) 
Sig.-
level 
(p <) 
Members 
(148) 
Non-
members 
(146) 
Sig.-
level 
(p <) 
Planted before rains 
(% fields) 
46 
(31.5%) 
47 
(35.1%) 
0.676 57 
(38.5%) 
61 
(41.8%) 
0.369 
Line planting 
(% fields) 
97 
(66.4%) 
99 
(73.9%) 
0.686 
 
97 
(65.5%) 
99 
(67.8%) 
0.349 
Applied fertilizer 
(% fields) 
0 0 - 1 
 
1 0.505 
Applied manure 
(% fields) 
40 
(27.4%) 
40 
(29.9%) 
0.985 42 
(28.4%) 
42 
(28.8%) 
0.906 
Weedings (no.) 1.88 1.98 0.075* 1.99 2.08 0.042** 
Terraced field (%) 83 
(56.8%) 
71 
(53%) 
0.035** 80 
(54.1%) 
73 
(50%) 
0.279 
Own field (%) 88 
(60.3%) 
91 
(67.9%) 
0.489 60 
(40.5%) 
60 
(41.1%) 
0.251 
Fields reported to 
have good soil fertility 
(%) 
52 
(35.6%) 
56 
(41.8%) 
0.529 86 
(58.1%) 
89 
(61%) 
0.435 
 
* 0.1 significance level, **0.05 significance level, ***0.01 significance level 
Table 16 shows the type of soils in sorghum fields among members and non-members, 
respectively. Members were significantly more likely to plant sorghum on fields with sandy 
soil (38%) while non-members were more likely to plant sorghum on red soils (36 %). No 
significant differences were found for maize. 
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Table 16: Soil type on fields planted to sorghum and maize (%) 
Type of soil Sorghum Maize 
Members 
(n=146) 
Non-
members 
(n=134) 
Total 
(n=280) 
Members 
(n=148) 
Non-
members 
(146) 
Total 
(n=297) 
Sandy 38 24 26 28 21 24 
Red soil 
27 36 30 22 35 28 
Black soil 19 28 35 33 34 34 
Murram (stony or 
rocky soil) 
13 8 9 10 5 7 
Sandy and red soil 
0 2 
 
2 2 1 2 
Red and black soil 
1 2 
 
3 2 3 2 
Sandy and black 
soil 
3 2 
 
2 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Chi-square: p = 0.063 (sorghum), p = 0.137 (maize) 
5.3 Utilization of sorghum  
Table 17 shows the main uses of sorghum and maize. Households used maize primarily for 
food security (63 %), while 36 % reported that some maize was sold. By contrast, the 
majority of sorghum growers (63%) reported using sorghum for both food and for sale, while 
only 11 % of growers reported that sorghum was mainly used as food. The dual use of 
sorghum highlights its importance as a food security crop in drought years when the maize 
harvest fails. 
Table 17: Main uses of sorghum and maize (%) 
 
 
Main use 
Sorghum Maize 
Member
s 
(n=150) 
Non-members  Members 
(n=150) 
Non-members  
Sellers 
(n=75) 
Non- 
sellers 
(n=72) 
Total 
(n=297) 
Sellers 
(n=75) 
Non –
sellers 
(n=72) 
Total 
(n=297) 
Food security 11 19 61 25 65 56 31 63 
Cash income 15 13 0 11 0 1 1 1 
Both food 
security and 
cash income 
74 68 25 61 35 43 16 36 
Feeding 
chickens 
1 
 
0 14 4 0 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Chi-square p = 0.000 (sorghum), p = 0.226 (maize) 
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Table 18 shows sales channels for Gadam sorghum for the 2012 season short rains. (Red 
sorghum accounted for only 2 % of sorghum sold, while no growers reported sale of white 
sorghum). The share of households selling exceeds 100 % since some growers sold through 
more than one channel. The majority of both members (86 %) and non-members (32 %) sold 
sorghum to Smart Logistics. Side-selling was rare among group members (14 %). Among 
non-members, half sold to Smart Logistics through collection centres or brokers. Smart 
Logistics collection centres offered the highest price for sorghum (25 KES/kg), while the 
lowest prices were offered by traders in local markets (19 KES/kg) and local shopkeepers 
(17 KES/kg). The prices paid by traders from outside Kitui district (22 KES/kg) were 
competitive with the price offered by Smart Logistics brokers (22 KES/kg) who collected 
sorghum at the farm gate and paid growers immediately and in cash. This may explain why 
non-members sold the highest average volumes (588 kg) to brokers from outside the district. 
The average volumes were calculated with respect to the number of households who sold 
through a specific channel.  Members sold an average of 342 kg through Smart Logistics 
compared to 189 kg for non-members. For households selling Gadam the average volume 
sold was 314 kg/household for members and 198 kg/household for non-members. On 
average, the member of a Smart Logistics group selling to a Smart Logistics collection 
centre in 2012 sold 342 kg of sorghum at a price of 25 KES/kg, earning KES 8,550 from 
sorghum sales. 
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Table 18: Sales channels for Gadam sorghum, Short Rains Oct-Dec 2012 (%) 
Sales channel Price 
(KES/
kg) 
Households 
selling Gadam (no.) 
Average quantity of Gadam 
sold (kg)* 
Members 
(n=123) 
Non-members 
(n=66) 
Members 
(n=123) 
Non-members 
(n=66) 
Smart Logistics 
collection centre 
25.0 106 
(86.2%) 
21 
(31.8%) 
342 189 
 
Smart Logistics 
broker 
23.0 4 
(3.3%) 
11 
(16.7%) 
160 202 
 
Broker from 
outside the district 
22.0 5 
(4.1%) 
9 
(13.6%) 
68 588 
Schools 20.0 0 
 
8 
(12.1%) 
0 70 
Other villagers/ 
consumers 
19.5 3 
(2.4%) 
 
3 
(4.5%) 
 
15 65 
Traders in local 
markets 
19.0 5 
(4.1%) 
 
14 
(21.2%) 
118 99 
Local shopkeeper 17.0 4 
(3.3%) 
3 
(4.5%) 
130 73 
Average volume 
sold per household 
    
314* 
 
198 
* The figure for average volume sold differs from that in Table 9, which includes both sellers and non-
sellers over both the Short and Long Rains in 2012. 
5.4 Uses of sorghum income 
School fees and materials (uniforms, textbooks) were ranked as the most important use of 
income from sorghum (weighted frequency 44 %), with buying food and goats ranked 
second and third, respectively (Table 19). Investing in children’s education is important for 
women since they do not own land and children are viewed as a source of security in the 
event of separation or divorce. Goats function as a ‘bank’ since they are easily disposable. 
When households acquire income from sorghum sales, they buy goats which are later sold 
to buy inputs or meet pressing household needs. 
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Table 19: Uses of income from sorghum 
Use of income Weighted Frequency (no.) Weighted (%) 
School fees and school 
materials 
83 43.5 
Household food needs 44 23.0 
Goats 15 7.9 
Family health 8 4.2 
Settling debts 5 2.6 
Buying farm inputs 8 4.2 
Terracing and ploughing 3 1.6 
Investing in a shop 5 2.6 
Others 20 10.5 
Total 191 100.0 
 
Though necessarily subjective, 83 % of group members perceived an improvement in their 
economic conditions since 2009, with 68% of non-member sellers and 71 % of non-member 
non-sellers reporting the same. Paradoxically, the average income from crops and sorghum 
sales were highest among the non-member sellers, yet it was this group that felt that there 
had been least improvement in their economic condition.  
Annual university/college fees per child were highest among the group members (17,666 
KES/year) compared to 2253 KES/year for non-member sellers and 3560 KES/year for non-
members non-sellers (Table 20). Non-members non-sellers had significantly more children 
attending school (3.3). Primary school fees per child were significantly higher for non-
members sellers (4145 KES/year) compared to group members (1893 KES/year) and non-
members and non-sellers (989 KES/year). The use of sorghum income for school fees may 
reflect the economic insecurity of women, who are vulnerable in the case of widowhood and 
divorce because they cannot own land or other assets, which belong to their husband. For 
women, investment in children’s education offers a ‘retirement package’ and some hope of 
economic security in the future. 
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Table 20: Investment in assets and education  
 
Assets ( 000 KES)     
Total value of assets (KES) 125 
(138) 
113 
(175) 
113 
(686) 
0.749 
Value of assets purchased since 2009 (KES) 290 
(457) 
249 
(416) 
390 
(537) 
0.165 
School attendance and fees     
Children attending school (no.) 2.6 
(1.84) 
3.0 
(1.60) 
3.3 
(2.11) 
0.014** 
Children in secondary school and college (no.) 0.79 
(0.96) 
0.73 
(0.89) 
0.77 
(0.92) 
0.904 
University fees per child (KES/year) 17.7 
(60.9) 
2.3 
(9.0) 
3.6 
(15.2) 
0.017** 
Secondary school fees per child (KES/year) 11 
(18) 
14 
(25) 
12 
(17) 
0.470 
Primary school fees per child (KES/year) 1.9 
(4.3) 
4.1 
(9.5) 
0.9 
(1.9) 
0.002*** 
Total expenditure on school fees (KES/year) 32 
(56) 
51 
(153) 
35 
(65) 
0.362 
 
* 0.1 significance level, **0.05 significance level, ***0.01 significance level 
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6. Social Inclusion  
“Social inclusion” measures the participation in the value chain by growers that may be 
otherwise excluded by virtue of poverty, gender, or lack of resources. An inclusive value 
chain can be defined in at least two ways: 
The value chain is neutral with regard to inclusion. In this case, disadvantaged households 
have an equal chance of participating in the value chain, and we would expect to find no 
significant differences in wealth indicators between participants. 
The value chain is biased with regard to inclusion, favouring disadvantaged households. In 
this case, disadvantaged households have a higher chance of participating in the value 
chain than others, and we would expect to find significant differences in wealth indicators 
between participants. 
For any given value chain, therefore, we can expect to find that some inclusion indicators are 
neutral while others show a bias towards disadvantaged households. 
Information on the selection criteria for group members was obtained from three Smart 
Logistics clusters (Table 21). Generally, the cluster leaders agreed on the three most 
important selection criteria, although not on their order of importance. ‘Ability to pay the 
membership fee’ and ‘quantity of sorghum for sale’ can be described as objective ‘threshold’ 
criteria that households had to meet before being considered for membership. Membership 
fees ranged from 10 KES/week to 100 KES/month. For example, the members of Kanduti 
Farmers Field School paid a registration fee of just Ks 100 ($1.1). Similarly, the Maliku 
Cereal Growers cluster recommended that prospective members should be able to sell at 
least one 90 kg bag of Gadam sorghum. Other variables were more subjective and related to 
commitment and willingness to follow group norms. ‘Reputation of the household’ and ‘full-
time farmer’ belonged in this category. Both are important for group cohesion, which helps 
determine the overall performance of the group.  
Table 21: Criteria for membership to Smart Logistics Groups 
Name of Cluster Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3 
Maliku Cereal  
Growers 
Quantity of sorghum 
 for sale 
Reputation and 
behavior 
of the household 
Household head is  
full time farmer 
Kanduti Farmers 
 Field School 
Ability to pay 
 membership fee  
 
Reputation and 
behavior 
of the household 
Quantity of 
sorghum 
 for sale 
Kawongo Cereal  
Growers  
Reputation and 
behavior 
 of the household 
Relative/friend Ability to pay 
 membership fee 
Source: interviews with cluster leaders. 
The inclusiveness of the value chain for sorghum beer was estimated by identifying inclusion 
indicators and estimating their importance in determining membership of a Smart Logistics 
group. Membership was hypothesised to depend on 10 independent variables (Table 22). All 
10 variables may be regarded as indicators of inclusion. Besides obvious indicators such 
income, sex of the household head, land ownership, dependency ratio, and maize 
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purchases, we also included a dummy variable for full-time farmer, and the distance from a 
Smart Logistics collection centre (TIME_CENTRE).  
Table 22: Definition of variables used in regression analyses 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
(biased towards 
inclusion) 
Dependent variables  
CATEGORY 1, If household is a member; 2, if household is 
non-member seller and 3, if household is non-
member non seller 
 
SLMEMBER 1, If household is a member, 0 otherwise  
Independent variables  
TIME_CENTRE Walking time to Smart Logistics collection 
centre (minutes) 
_ 
FHH_DEFACTO 1 if de facto household head is female, 0 
otherwise  
+ 
HHAGE_SQ Age of household head, squared + 
TOTSCHOOL Formal schooling of household head (years) - 
DEP_RATIO Dependency ratio (family size/members under 
15) 
+ 
MAIZE_PURCHASE Months that household bought maize in 2012 
(no.) 
+ 
OCCUP 1 if household head is full-time farmer, 0 
otherwise 
+ 
OWN_PCAP     Land owned per family member (acres) - 
OWN_PADULT Land owned per adult (acres) - 
INCOME_PCAP Household income per capita (000 KES) - 
Two regressions were estimated. The first estimated determinants of Smart Logistics group 
membership (SLMEMBER) using binary logistic regression. The second used multinomial 
logistic regression to compare the determinants for members, non-member sellers, and non-
member non-sellers (CATEGORY). 
Logistic regression 
Table 23 shows estimation results for the logistic regression. The significance test for the 
model Chi-Square (384.648) was statistically significant at the 1 % level (p > 0018), 
suggesting that the model gave a reasonable fit. The model correctly predicted 61 % of the 
cases.  
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Table 23: Determinants of membership of Smart Logistics group (SLMEMBER = 1) 
Variables Coefficient Sig. level 
(p> ) 
Odds ratio 
Intercept -2.1522 0.002  
    
TIME_CENTRE -8.65e-06 0.999 ns 1.000 
FHH_DEFACTO 0.6186 0.023 ** 1.856 
HHAGE_SQUARED 0.0002 0.010 ** 1.000 
TOTSCHOOL_YEARS 0.1148 0.004 ** 1.121 
DEP_RATIO 0.2345 0.054 ** 1.264 
MAIZE_PURCHASE -0.0988 0.005 ** 0.905 
OCCUP 0.6742 0.019 ** 1.962 
LAND_PCAP 0.3140 0.030 ** 1.368 
LAND_PADULT -0.1218 0.036 ** 0.885 
INCOME_PCAP -0.0021 0.393 ns 0.997 
N = 297    
Log likelihood 27.05   
Prob > Chi square 0.0026   
Pseudo R2 0.0657   
Cases correctly classified  60.94 %   
* 0.1 significance level, **0.05 significance level, ***0.01 significance level, ns not significant 
Table 23 shows that eight of the 10 independent variables were statistically significant at the 
0.05 % level or above.  
The coefficient for FHH_DEFACTO was positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
households where the head was female were more likely to be group members. The odds of 
a FHH_DEFACTO household belonging to a Smart Logistics group are almost two times 
higher (1.9) than where the head is a man. The coefficients for HHAGE_SQ and SCHOOL 
were also positive and significant, indicating that when other variables are controlled for, 
members of Smart Logistic groups are more likely to be older and have more years of formal 
schooling. Member households also have significantly higher dependency ratios 
(DEP_RATIO), meaning that adults must support more children. The coefficient for OCCUP 
was positive and statistically significant. Full-time farmers were twice as likely to belong to a 
Smart Logistics group. As we have seen (Table 20), one Smart Logistics cluster used this as 
a criterion for group membership. Interestingly, the coefficient for INCOME_PCAP was 
negative but not statistically significant, indicating that income was not an important 
determinant of group membership. Finally, the LAND_PCAP and LAND_PADULT variables 
were both statistically significant, but with opposite signs. Households with higher owned 
land per capita were more likely, and households with less land per adult were less likely to 
be group members. This may reflect the fact that households with more land per head were 
more likely to have land available for sorghum cultivation, while those with less land per 
adult were more likely to have occupations other than farming. One surprising result was the 
indicator for household food security (MAIZE_PURCHASE), where group members were 
significantly less likely to buy maize. However, this may be explained by the need for poorer 
households to conserve as much maize as possible for home consumption in order to avoid 
buying in the hungry months when prices are highest.  
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Why are poorer households more likely to join Smart Logistics groups? One explanation is 
that they have fewer opportunities to earn cash income. As we noted, sellers have fewer 
livestock assets. By contrast, better-off households invest in livestock which provides a 
major source of income. Poorer households may find it more difficult to save and buy 
livestock, while the need to conserve maize for home consumption limits their ability to earn 
cash. By contrast, sorghum requires no cash investment except for seed, which can be 
accessed on credit and repaid after harvest. Second, poorer households have more time 
available to attend frequent group meetings. Among member households, men usually 
delegated attendance at group meetings to their wives. Finally, poorer households may have 
a higher preference for growing sorghum either on grounds of taste, or as a source of food 
security in years when maize does not do well.  
Multinomial logistic regression 
The significance test for the model Chi-Square was statistically significant at the 10 % level, 
suggesting that the model gave a reasonable fit (Table 24).  
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Table 24: Determinants of membership of Smart Logistics group (CATEGORY) 
(reference group= member)  
Variables Panel 1 Panel 2 
Non-members, sellers Non-members, non-sellers 
Coefficient Sig.-
level  
(p > ) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Coefficient Sig.-
level  
(p > ) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Intercept 1.0174 0.214  1.8651 0.023  
       
TIME_CENTRE 0.0021 0.564 
ns 
1.002 -0.0029 0.504 
ns 
0.997 
FHH_DEFACTO -0.4407 0.172 
ns 
0.643 -0.8194 0.016 ** 0.440 
HHAGE_SQ -0.000 0.115 
ns 
0.998 -0.0003 0.009 ** 0.999 
TOTSCHOOL -0.0832 0.080 * 0.920 -0.1458 0.003 ** 0.864 
DEP_RATIO -0.2107 0.203 
ns 
0.809 -0.2091 0.167 
ns 
0.811 
MAIZE_PURCHASE 0.1083 0.012 ** 1.114 0.0919 0.032 ** 1.096 
OCCUP -0.6035 0.077 * 0.546 -0.7082 0.041 ** 0.492 
LAND_PCAP -0.3639 0.164 
ns 
0.694 -0.2475 0.117 
ns 
0.780 
LAND_PADULT 0.0267 0.847 
ns 
1.027 0.1349 0.038 ** 1.144 
INCOME_PCAP 0.0020 0.522 
ns 
1.002 0.0025 0.383 
ns 
1.002 
N = 297       
Log likelihood 36.38      
Prob > Chi square 0.0139      
Pseudo R2 0.0591      
 
* 0.1 significance level, **0.05 significance level, ***0.01 significance level, ns not significant 
 
Table 24 compares the referent group of households that are members of a Smart Logistics 
group with non-members (both sellers and non-sellers). The coefficients are the multinomial 
logit estimates for a one-unit change in the independent variable, holding other variables in 
the model constant. Recall that the parameter estimates are interpreted in relation to the 
reference group of group members. A positive coefficient implies that a one-unit increase in 
the independent variable will increase the likelihood that the household will remain in the 
non-member group, while a negative coefficient indicates that a one-unit change will reduce 
the likelihood that the household will remain in the non-member group. To make the 
coefficients easier to interpret, we take the exponent of the log odds, or the odds ratio. Thus, 
an independent variable with an odds ratio of less than one means that a change in this 
variable increases the odds of being included in the reference group of members, while an 
odds ratio above one reduces the odds of being included in the reference group. 
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Panel 1 compares the reference group of households that are Smart Logistics members with 
households that are non-members but sell sorghum through a Smart Logistics group. Three 
of the independent variables (TOTSCHOOL, MAIZE_PURCHASE, and OCCUP) were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level or above. The negative coefficients for TOTSCHOOL 
and OCCUP indicate that non-members that sell sorghum are less likely to remain non-
members if they have more formal schooling and if they are full-time farmers. On the other 
hand, the coefficient for MAIZE_PURCHASE has a positive sign, indicating that households 
are less likely to become members if they make more maize purchases. 
Panel 2 compares the reference group of households that are Smart Logistics members with 
households that are neither group members nor sell sorghum. Six of the 10 independent 
variables were statistically significant at the 10 % level or above. The coefficients for 
FHH_DEFACTO, HHAGE_SQ, TOTSCHOOL, and OCCUP displayed a negative sign 
indicating that a one-unit increase in these variables reduced the likelihood of being non-
members and non-sellers. However, a one-unit increase in LAND_PADULT and 
MAIZE_PURCHASE increased the likelihood of not becoming a group member and of 
selling sorghum. 
Table 25 provides further information on why households did not join Smart Logistics groups. 
Interestingly, the main reason was not because non-members failed to meet the selection 
criteria. Only 17 % of non-members reported that they did not produce enough sorghum to 
join, and only 1 % reported that the membership fee was too high.  Instead, the most 
important reason (36 % of non-members) was the time required to attend group meetings. 
Similarly, of the 15 households that had formerly been members of a Smart Logistics group, 
the majority (73 %) reported their main reason for dropping out was the lack of time to attend 
meetings. Besides group meetings, members were also required to attend meetings at 
demonstration plots.  Eighty percent of Smart Logistics groups in the sample had 
demonstration plots where group members were trained in sorghum production.  
 
Table 25: Reasons given for not joining a Smart Logistics group (%) 
Reason 
Non-members 
Sellers 
(n=73) 
Non-sellers 
(n=71) 
Total 
(n=144)  
Do not have enough time to attend meetings 44 28 36 
Do not produce enough sorghum to sell 10 25 17 
No Smart Logistics group near enough 11 9 10 
Do not have enough information on Smart Logistics group 6 13 9 
No benefit from joining Smart Logistics group 12 3 8 
Smart Logistics sorghum price is too low 7 9 8 
Do not know a Smart Logistics group to join 2 6 4 
Do not trust the group to pay me 1 4 3 
Group allows only friends and relatives 3 1 2 
Smart Logistics do not pay immediately 1 1 1 
Cannot afford registration and membership fee 1 1 1 
Smart Logistics is too strict on quality 1 0 1 
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Failure to attend group meetings or meetings at demonstration plots was punished by fines. 
These ranged from token payments of KES 20-30 in the case of the Kawongo Cereal 
Growers group up to KES 100 in the case of the Maliku Cereal Growers group (Table 26). Of 
the 150 members of Smart Logistics Groups in the sample, 65 members (43.3%) reported 
missing a group meeting and 46 (37.1%) had missed a demonstration plot meeting. Sixty 
percent of members had paid fines for missing meetings. 
Demonstration plot meetings are held from 8 am to 4 pm once every week during the 
season. Members who miss the meeting pay a fine of KES 200, or KES 20 if they arrive late. 
Those who refuse to pay are given a grace period until harvest. Those who don’t pay after 
harvest won’t get their share of the harvest from the demonstration plot. It’s common that 
people don’t come but they pay the fines because they don’t want to miss out on this 
harvest.  If they can’t come because of an emergency, they are not fined but given extra 
work to do. (Kanduti Self Help Group March 2013) 
Table 26: Time required for meetings and penalties for non-attendance  
 
Name of Cluster Fees Meetings Fines 
Maliku Cereal  
Growers (Katulani) 
KES 100 
registration fee 
Once a month for 2 
hours 
KES 10-50 per day 
Kanduti Farmers 
 Field School 
No registration fee, 
pay KES 10 each 
weekly meeting 
Once a week for 5 
hours 
KES 100 
Kawongo Cereal  
Growers 
KES 700 
registration fee, and 
members receive a 
goat 
Once a month, for 2 
hours. 
KES 20 if 30 
minutes late. KES 
50 if longer 
One reason non-members did not have time to attend meetings was that they were already 
members of other groups. Of the 147 non-members of Smart Logistics groups, 96 (65.3 %) 
belonged to other farmer groups (Table 27). Non-members that sold sorghum through a 
Smart Logistics group were less likely than non-member non-sellers to belong to another 
group. These households were ‘free-riders’ who used the group as a convenient way to sell 
their sorghum. However, households that reported ‘lack of time’ as a reason for not joining a 
Smart Logistics group were not those that were already members of other groups, but 
households that did not belong to any group. Evidently, the livelihood strategies of such 
households did not depend on collective action.  
Table 27: Membership of other groups for non-members of Smart Logistics groups 
 
Variable Sellers  
(n=75) 
Non-sellers 
(n=72) 
Sig. Level 
(p<) 
Non-members who are members 
 of other groups (no.) 
43 
(57.3) 
53 
(73.6) 
0.056** 
**0.05 significance level 
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Among all groups, the most important activity was table-banking (chama). Members who 
chose to participate paid a deposit that was used as a rotating loan. Table banking was a 
central feature of Smart Logistics groups, with eight in 10 members participating (Table 28). 
Although non-sellers were more likely to be members of other groups, they were less likely 
to participate in table-banking. 
Table 28: Participation in table-banking by all group members (%)  
Variable  
Members of Smart 
Logistics groups 
(n=150) 
Non-members who are 
members of other groups 
Sig. 
Level 
(p<) 
Sellers 
(n=43) 
Non-sellers 
(n=53) 
 
Households participating 
in table banking (no.) 
118 
(78.6) 
35 
(81.4) 
32 
(60.4) 
0.032** 
**0.05 significance level 
Members who want to participate in table banking must pay KES 2,100 (KES 2,000 for 
shares in the bank and KES 100 membership fee to the group). Members are allowed to 
borrow for one week, after which loan is repaid. The maximum loan is KES 5,000. Members 
usually borrow only when they expect to earn cash soon from some other source (for 
example, selling from a kiosk, or buying and selling poultry or goats). If they default, they pay 
back double. Most people will quit rather than risk defaulting, and lose trust. Alternatively, 
members can pay just KES 100 and join the group in order to sell sorghum. (Kanduti 
Farmers Field School, March 2013). 
In sum, Smart Logistics groups were socially and economically inclusive. Households 
headed by women, with high dependency ratios, and with less land per adult family member 
were significantly more likely to be members. Similarly, membership was not significantly 
related to income per head, showing that membership was not confined to better-off 
households. However, the reasons why Smart Logistics groups were inclusive may be due 
to other factors besides sorghum:   
1. The name ‘Smart Logistics group’ is a misnomer because 14 of the 15 sample 
groups were formed before 2009 (Table 1). On average, they pre-dated Smart 
Logistics by five years. Their main function was table-banking, which provided a form 
of forced savings and allowed members to access low-interest loans without 
collateral. Of the 150 households that belonged to a ‘Smart Logistics group’, 118 (79 
%) participated in table-banking. Sorghum was simply an additional activity to their 
core business of generating loans to members. Households within ‘Smart Logistics 
groups’ were free to include or exclude themselves from the sorghum value chain. In 
the 2012 short rains, for example, only 47% of group members actually sold 
sorghum.  
2. The main reason households gave for not joining a Smart Logistic group was 
shortage of time to attend meetings. Thus, many households deliberately chose not 
to join a Smart Logistics group. They excluded themselves, because they saw 
membership as a poor use of their time. Thus, it would be a mistake to view ‘Smart 
Logistics groups’ as exclusive clubs. The majority of sample households were 
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members of some group. Of the 297 households in the sample, 246 (83%) belonged 
to some type of group. This included 96 (66 %) of the 147 households that did not 
belong to Smart Logistics Groups. Rather than ask whether groups were ‘inclusive’, it 
is more appropriate to ask why 17 % of households excluded themselves and chose 
not to join.  
3. Smart Logistics groups may be inclusive by accident rather than design. Most Smart 
Logistics groups were formed for other purposes. Hence, their inclusiveness may 
have less to do with sorghum than activities like table-banking. On the other hand, 
households that have not joined Smart Logistics groups have not been deliberately 
excluded. Rather, they have deliberately opted out, on the grounds that membership 
is too time-consuming. They have excluded themselves, because they see no 
benefits from group membership or from growing sorghum. 
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7. Conclusion  
The value chain for sorghum beer in Kenya is inclusive, as defined by the standard socio-
economic indicators. Not only is membership unrelated to income but households headed by 
women, with high dependency ratios, and with less land per adult family member are more 
likely to be members. This suggests that the benefits from commercialization of sorghum in 
Kenya are reaching poorer smallholders. 
Average income from sorghum sales remains low, however (< KES 9,000 in 2012). Income 
per capita among group members averages KES 49,400. In terms of household income, 
therefore, income from sorghum is equivalent to about 18 % of average per capita income or 
just 3 % of total household income. Although at the margin this is important for poorer 
smallholders, it is not enough on its own to to lift a household above the poverty line. On the 
other hand, sorghum provides cash at a critical period before the payment of school fees in 
January. Consequently, sorghum is valued because it contributes to a major item of 
household expenditure. Moreover, investment in children’s education offers a ‘retirement 
package’ for women, who have no legal rights to land or other household assets in the event 
of widowhood or divorce. From a gender perspective, therefore, sorghum makes a valuable 
contribution to economic security for women, by establishing a claim on their children’s 
future income. 
Less than 10 % of income from sorghum is invested in agriculture, casting doubt on the 
theory that linking farmers with markets for dryland cereals will result in a transition from 
subsistence to commercial agriculture. Eastern Kenya is a semi-arid environment where the 
returns from investment in agriculture are low and variable. This makes re-investment in 
agriculture a risky proposition. Income from sorghum is invested either in goats (viewed as 
insurance against drought) or in education that yields better or more secure returns than 
crop agriculture. In effect, income from sorghum is being used as a passport out of 
agriculture for the children of sorghum growers. The incentive for dryland farmers (especially 
women, who do not have legal rights to land) to invest in agriculture needs to be compared 
against the returns from these alternative investments. 
Sorghum growers in eastern Kenya insist on growing maize although half reported that 
maize yielded poorly four years in five. At the same time, they agreed that sorghum gave a 
higher yield than maize in both a normal and in a drought year. Researchers have struggled 
to explain why farmers in such environments should continue to grow maize. The grower 
survey suggests two answers. One is a clearly expressed taste preference, by both adults 
and children, for maize over sorghum. The second is the recognition that ‘maize is always 
there on the market’. Consequently, food deficit households have a strong incentive to plant 
maize because, when they run out of food, their only option is to buy maize. Whatever maize 
they grow for themselves reduces the amount of maize they will be forced to purchase. 
Farmers in eastern Kenya are therefore ‘locked in’ to the market for maize, partly by choice 
and partly from economic necessity (Brooks et al 2009). 
While Smart Logistics has successfully developed an inclusive business model, it has been 
less successful in meeting the demand for sorghum from EABL. A decade after the 
introduction of sorghum beer, Smart Logistics is supplied by only 3,000 growers and Kenyan 
growers meet only one-third of EABL’s total demand for sorghum. Experience with sorghum 
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beer shows that the reach of these models seems equally limited in Ghana (7,000 
smallholders) and Zambia (4,600 smallholders) (Diageo plc, 2011). Herein may lie the 
weakness of inclusive business models. The more inclusive the model, the smaller the 
average quantity supplied by each grower, and the higher the transaction cost for the buyer. 
Reaching large numbers of growers on the scale required to meet demand requires 
significant investment in aggregation centres, training, as well as access to trade finance in 
order to buy the crop from farmers. The challenge for such models is to combine inclusion 
with the scale required to meet demand. Is this trade-off inherent in the nature of inclusive 
business models?  
Finally, the future for sorghum beer in Kenya remains heavily dependent on political 
decisions. Sorghum beer can only compete with untaxed, illicit brews under a favorable tax 
regime. As in other developing countries, however, a large share of government revenue in 
Kenya is met from indirect taxation. This makes the tax break on sorghum beer a tempting 
target. Ultimately, Kenya’s need for tax revenue has triumphed over the need to protect 
public health. Legislation and not cheaper beer is now the government’s preferred option to 
protect consumers from illegal brews. How effective this will be remains to be seen. The 
story of sorghum beer in Kenya illustrates the important role played by policy makers in the 
development of a successful value chain, and the vulnerability of this same value chain to a 
subsequent change in policy. Success is never final. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Macro-economic data for beer, Kenya, 1963-2011 
Variable Beer production Beer consumption Adult population Beer price Maize price Real price beer Beer excise Total excise 
Units 000 litres 000 litres 
No. 
Ks/bottle Ks/kg Beer/maize mill Ks Mill Ks 
1960 23044 18484 
4118695 
1.78 0.66 2.70 1284  
1961 39572 20643 
4288808 
1.81 0.66 2.74 1431 3860 
1962 39586 20970 
4458922 
1.97 0.66 2.98 1697 5440 
1963 44009 23821 
4629035 
2.03 0.59 3.44 2154 6020 
1964 48455 23657 
4799149 
2.03 0.59 3.44 2155 6215 
1965 49460 29749 
4969262 
2.16 0.88 2.45 2479 6384 
1966 50088 31542 
5139376 
2.18 0.88 2.48 3044 7624 
1967 48839 34026 
5309489 
2.3 0.88 2.61 3343 9590 
1968 60001 41714 
5479603 
2.3 0.66 3.48 4291 11919 
1969 64757 46210 
5649400 
2.4 0.55 4.36 4334 12914 
1970 79533 77105 
5873216 
2.4 0.55 4.36 5838 15596 
1971 93537 91974 
6097032 
2.3 0.55 4.18 6981 17160 
1972 104825 102059 
6320848 
2.35 0.59 3.98 7647 17664 
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1973 139393 125848 
6544664 
2.35 0.6 3.92 9793 21632 
1974 157634 153320 
6768480 
2.6 0.75 3.47 11116 24632 
1975 153812 153260 
6992295 
3 1 3.00 10649 24894 
1976 165807 161340 
7216111 
3.1 1.18 2.63 24143 28623 
1977 195160 193550 
7439927 
3.3 1.28 2.58 14319 37803 
1978 204986 192635 
7663743 
3.68 1.27 2.90 15617 44741 
1979 212712 211283 
7887559 
4.08 1.25 3.26 15284 53614 
1980 132424 232685 
8214774 
4.4 2.69 1.64 17033 60257 
1981 248264 240425 
8541990 
4.79 4.17 1.15 18140 64672 
1982 233736 240945 
8869205 
6 4.1 1.46 17555 68380 
1983 217462 217017 
9196420 
6.88 4.19 1.64 15220 80558 
1984 230345 229994 
9523636 
7.43 4.91 1.51 16387 78297 
1985 263308 259643 
9850851 
7.7 6.21 1.24 17881 87505 
1986 301637 255235 
10178066 
8.06 6.5 1.24 20180 95782 
1987 307500 307592 
10505281 
8.55 6.5 1.32 21710 113930 
1988 314382 314456 
10832497 
9.43 6.5 1.45 21398 129757 
1989 315402 314169 
11159712 
10.68 6.5 1.64 23819 144295 
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1990 331114 325194 
11639689 
12.14 6.5 1.87 20686 151965 
1991 314005 308474 
12119666 
12.46 6.5 1.92 53326 170588 
1992 368648 362728 
12599644 
13.3 6.29 2.11 190367 365070 
1993 349200 340199 
13079621 
14.42 8.54 1.69 251321 442103 
1994 325005 351464 
13559598 
33.25 17.4 1.91 284696 486178 
1995 347000 300788 
14039575 
36.17 12.58 2.88 6538.9 11846.56 
1996 283208 246957 
14519552 
41 13.67 3.00 7172 12831.32 
1997 270396 247740 
14999530 
43.67 19.34 2.26 7452.02 13321.7 
1998 263015 256555 
15479507 
49.5 16.7 2.96 7927.1 13831.9 
1999 188455 188429 
15959484 
51.25 19.79 2.59 7043.21 13278.85 
2000 202932 208187 
16561249 
50.14 20.54 2.44 7487.5 13605.43 
2001 184300 199505 
17163014 
53.96 15.59 3.46 7307.21 12446.18 
2002 191925 193937 
17764779 
55 15.44 3.56 7779.65 12925.05 
2003 222293 207518 
18366544 
60 17.96 3.34 7907.96 13445.49 
2004 237548 268067 
18968309 
60 20.51 2.93 8350.8 14842.55 
2005 266261 265541 
19570074 
62.6 20.44 3.06 9325.11 16233.75 
2006 311557 297325 
20171839 
66.41 20.9 3.18 10021.94 17121.72 
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2007 393422 350937 
20773604 
69.71 19.04 3.66 11266.54 19696.79 
2008 424863 381059 
21375369 
78.47 26.45 2.97 11091.33 22097.21 
2009 396819 340230 
21977134 
90.24 27.53 3.28 13756.56 23733.33 
2010 398618 358353 
22578899 
97.87 25.05 3.91 14701.54 26429.08 
2011 453685 412288 
23180664 
110.16 37.92 2.91 14456.04 27661.89 
 
Sources: Statistical Abstracts, various years. Adult population (15 +) from Census, 2009, 1999, 1989, 1979, 1969, 1962. 
